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Abstract
Performance sensitive debt (PSD) contracts link the paid coupon to a measure of ﬁrm
performance. PSD contracts are widely used, especially as corporate bank loans. In
a model where a ﬁrm has assets in place and the opportunity to invest in a growth
option, I analyze how PSD aﬀects equityholders' investment and ﬁnancing incentives.
With no pre-existing debt I show that PSD reduces a given ﬁrm's optimal leverage,
indicating that in this case PSD partially solves potential future conﬂicts related to
debt overhang. With debt in place I show that PSD ﬁnancing magniﬁes equityholders'
risk-shifting incentives, proving that in this case PSD is an ineﬃcient ﬁnancing tool.
My conclusion questions the hypothesis that PSD is used to prevent asset substitution.
When debt overhang creates problems of underinvestment I show that PSD ﬁnancing
partially resolves these ineﬃciencies. My conclusions are partially based on numerical
analysis, but they are robust to changes in input parameters.
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1 Introduction
The interplay between ﬁnancing and investment decisions of ﬁrms has been widely studied
in the corporate ﬁnance literature. In their seminal paper, Modigliani & Miller (1958) proves
the famous capital structure irrelevance principle, which states that under the assumptions
of perfect and frictionless capital markets and ﬁxed investment decisions, the value of a
ﬁrm is independent of its ﬁnancing decisions. Two important market frictions question the
validity of the irrelevance theorem. The ﬁrst is the problem of agency costs identiﬁed by
Jensen & Meckling (1976). They argue that in the presence of debt ﬁnancing, equityholders
might be tempted to engage in asset substitution or risk-shifting activities. The second is
the debt overhang or underinvestment problem identiﬁed by Myers (1977). His argument is
that equityholders of a leveraged ﬁrm will underinvest because part of the proceeds accrue
to debtholders.
Recently, some attention has been given to the widespread use of performance sensitive debt
contracts (PSD). PSD contracts link the coupon paid on a ﬁrm's debt to a variable measur-
ing its credit relevant performance. A typical PSD contract will trigger increased coupon
payments when ﬁrm performance worsens, and reduced coupon payments when ﬁrm perfor-
mance strengthens. The two most commonly used categories of credit performance measures
are either based on ﬁrm cash-ﬂows or ﬁrm credit ratings. Since the mid 1990's performance
sensitive features in both private and public debt are common1. Market participants indicate
that more than 50% of recently issued syndicated bank loans in Europe include such features.
1See, e.g., Mjøs, Myklebust, & Persson (2011) and Asquith, Beatty, & Weber (2005) for more detailed
information.
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To provide a rationale for the use of PSD, two main theoretical explanations have been
given. The ﬁrst explanation is that high quality ﬁrms use PSD to signal its quality to the
market. They are able to do so since the threat of increased coupons make PSD ﬁnancing
too expensive for low quality ﬁrms. The second explanation is that PSD ﬁnancing disciplines
equityholders and thereby reduce the problems of asset substitution.
In this paper I focus on how the use of PSD might eﬀect a ﬁrm's investment and ﬁnancing
incentives. I do so by extending the model of Leland (1994) to include investment and PSD.
In my model a ﬁrm has assets in place and a growth option to expand its operations. I
allow for the possibility that the ﬁrm's initial capital structure might consist of both debt
and equity. Equityholders endogenously determine when to exercise the growth option, and
how to ﬁnance this option. They do so by maximizing the sum of equity and the new debt
used to ﬁnance the growth option, meaning that existing creditors face a risk of dilution.
The new debt contract might be of PSD type. My analysis allows for three diﬀerent priority
structures; equal priority (Pari Passu), old debt is senior to new debt and new debt is senior
to old debt. The two latter cases is commonly referred to as absolute priority rule (APR).
To brieﬂy summarize, I ﬁnd that with no pre-existing debt, using PSD reduces a given
ﬁrm's optimal leverage, indicating that in this case PSD partially solve potential future con-
ﬂicts related to debt overhang. With debt in place (debt overhang) I show that equal priority
or making new debt senior induces risk-shifting, since equityholders exercise the growth op-
tion too early in this case. Making the debt contract performance sensitive increases the
problems of risk-shifting. Giving priority to the old debt induces underinvesting, since eq-
uityholders exercise the growth option too late in this case. Interestingly, making the debt
contract performance sensitive partially resolves this underinvestment problem. My analysis
disregard the existing hypothesis that PSD is used to prevent asset substitution. In these
cases PSD is an ineﬃcient ﬁnancing tool compared to straight debt.
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My paper is related to the literature on real options, which has provided a good theoreti-
cal framework for the study of the interaction between ﬁnancing and investment choices2.
The broad consensus in this literature is that the use of debt ﬁnancing leads to ineﬃcient
investment decisions, which in turn destroys ﬁrm value, cf. the discussion above. This value
destruction is commonly referred to as agency cost of debt. Mauer & Ott (2000) study the
problem of underinvestment. They conclude that the costs resulting from underinvesting
incentives signiﬁcantly reduce optimal leverage. The same conclusion is reached by Titman
& Tsyplakov (2007) who construct a dynamic model allowing for continuous ﬁnancing and
investment choices. As an additional ﬁnding they show that the cost of underinvestment
decreases when debt maturity shortens. Mauer & Sarkar (2005) focus on the cost of overin-
vesting or risk-shifting. They show that such costs could signiﬁcantly reduce a ﬁrm's optimal
leverage as well as increase the credit spread paid on debt.
Sundaresan & Wang (2007) study a situation where a ﬁrm has multiple growth options
that need to be exercised sequentially. They show that pre-existing debt may signiﬁcantly
distort future investment decisions. Hackbarth & Mauer (2010) use a similar model, but they
focus on debt priority structures. Allowing the ﬁrm to choose an optimal priority structure,
they show that suboptimal investment incentives can be virtually eliminated.
Other important papers in the dynamic investment and ﬁnancing literature are, e.g., Mello
& Parsons (1992), Mauer & Triantis (1994), Parrino & Weisbach (1999), Hennesy & Whited
(2005), Hennesy & Whited (2007), Hackbarth et al. (2007), Tserlukevich (2008), Tsyplakov
(2008), Morellec & Schürhoﬀ (2010a) and Morellec & Schürhoﬀ (2010b).
My paper contributes to the existing literature by being the ﬁrst paper to introduce PSD
contracts into a real options framework, and thereby being able to make sharp predictions
on how such debt ﬁnancing aﬀect investment decisions.
2Dixit & Pindyck (1994) provide an extensive survey of the real options literature
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My paper also contributes to the growing literature on performance sensitive debt, and
the papers most closely related to this one is Bhanot & Mello (2006) and Koziol & Lawrenz
(2009)3. Manso et al. (2010) show that PSD might be used by ﬁrms as a way of signaling
quality to the market, and also ﬁnd empirical evidence supporting their conclusion. Bhanot
& Mello (2006) study rating-triggered bonds and their ability to mitigate risk-shifting prob-
lems. They argue that rating-triggered bonds are not an attractive ﬁnancing instrument,
and that they cannot solve the asset substitution problem. Contrary to this result, Koziol
& Lawrenz (2009) ﬁnd that rating-triggered bonds can be designed to mitigate asset sub-
stitution or asymmetric information problems. They conclude that the optimal design and
optimal use of step-up bonds are highly dependent on which of the two problems the bonds
are intended to deal with. My paper extends the analysis made in the two latter papers
by letting equityholders endogenously determine investment timing. Both Bhanot & Mello
(2006) and Koziol & Lawrenz (2009) incorporate investment risk using the approach pio-
neered by Leland (1998), where a ﬁrm is allowed to, ex post, increase asset risk by replacing
the ﬁrm's current assets with a set of new ones with the exact same value, but diﬀerent risk.
Hence, agency costs in these papers only reﬂect the impact of an increase in risk on the
expected values of interest tax shields and bankruptcy costs. Using a real options framework
I am able to capture this eﬀect, but I am also able to measures the potentially much larger
loss of pure operating ﬁrm value due to suboptimal investment decisions. I argue that this
extension provides a more thorough analysis, and a better understanding of PSD and its
eﬀect on corporate investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general model
set-up and provides solutions to the security values needed to perform the analysis. Here I
also discuss debt priority structures and optimal investment and ﬁnancing policies. Section
3 reports closed form solutions with no pre-existing debt and numerical solutions when the
ﬁrm has pre-existing debt. Here I also examine the robustness of the results to changes in
3Other important papers in the PSD literature is Tchistyi (2006), Tchistyi et al. (2010),Manso et al.
(2010), Lando & Mortensen (2004) and Asquith et al. (2005).
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model parameters. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Model Set-Up
I assume that a ﬁrm has assets in place which generate a continuous pre-tax cash ﬂow Xt,
and a growth option to expand its operations. More speciﬁcally I assume that Xt follows a
stochastic process under the equivalent probability measure Q speciﬁed by:
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdBt, X0 > 0, (1)
where µ and σ denotes, respectively, the constant drift and volatility parameters. dBt rep-
resents the increment of a standard Brownian motion. The ﬁrm may exercise the growth
option by paying an investment cost of I. Immediately upon exercise, the ﬁrm's cash ﬂows
increases from X to QX, where Q > 1. I assume that the option to exercise is irreversible.
The ﬁrm's initial capital structure (prior to investing) consists of equity and a single class
of debt, which has inﬁnite maturity and pays an exogenously given interest of c0. The ﬁrm
may ﬁnance the growth option by issuing a mixture of new debt and equity. I assume that
this new debt issue also has inﬁnite maturity. Since the goal in this paper is to study the
interactions of investment and performance sensitive debt I allow for the possibility that the
ﬁrm may issue debt with a more general coupon scheme reﬂecting ﬁrm performance. In this
model, the current cash ﬂow Xt, is the only state variable. Any measure of a ﬁrm's credit
quality is, thus, determined solely by Xt, and so Xt itself can be used as the performance
measure. In other words, the coupon scheme of the PSD obligation is given by some func-
tion C1(Xt). The function C1(Xt) can in principle have any functional form, and, thus, this
formulation is quite general. When solving the model I make the assumption that C1(Xt)
is linear. This simpliﬁes the procedure of solving the model and makes the analysis more
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transparent and tractable. The PSD obligation speciﬁes a linear coupon scheme given by
the function
C1(Xt) = c1 − γXtc1, (2)
where c1 > 0 is the initial coupon payment, Xt is the current cash ﬂow level, and γ is some
ex ante determined constant that governs the performance adjustment rate of the contract.
A large γ implies the PSD obligation is more performance sensitive. A γ = 0 is equal to
regular ﬁxed coupon debt.
I further assume that the ﬁrm is entitled to a tax beneﬁt of debt equal to τC1(Xt). This is
the only reason for issuing debt in this model. However, issuing debt also introduce some
bankruptcy costs α, assumed to be proportional to the all-equity ﬁrm value at default.
I assume that the manager's and the equityholders' incentives align, so that the manager
chooses the investment and ﬁnancing policy to maximize the market value of equity. Since
the ﬁrm might have pre-existing debt (c0 > 0), equity value maximization might not coincide
with total ﬁrm value maximization. Throughout the paper I refer to the former case as the
second-best solution, and the latter case as the ﬁrst-best solution. Assuming that the in-
vestment policy is non-veriﬁable and hence non-contractible, the pre-existing debt generates
a debt overhang problem which potentially distorts the investment and ﬁnancing decision of
the ﬁrm. Since creditors are rational and foresee this behavior they will price debt accord-
ingly, meaning that equityholders eventually bear the costs of the suboptimal behavior. As
in Leland (1994) equityholders optimally decide when to stop servicing debt and thereby go
default. If default occurs, equityholders receive nothing and creditors receive the value of
the ﬁrm's assets net of bankruptcy costs. How the recovery value is split among creditors is
determined by the priority structure, which in my model, is exogenously given.
Finally, I assume that agents are risk neutral and discount future cash ﬂows at a constant
risk-free rate r. Throughout the paper I use the subscripts 0 and 1 to denote values before
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and after option exercise, respectively.
2.2 All-Equity Benchmark
If the ﬁrm is all-equity ﬁnanced the total ﬁrm value vu0 (x, 0) is given by
vu0 (x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(1− τ)Xtdt|X0 = x
]
=
x
r − µ(1− τ). (3)
I impose the usual restriction r > µ.
The ﬁrm has an option to expand its operations by paying a ﬁxed investment cost I. The
increased production capacity from the option exercise increase the ﬁrm's cash ﬂows from x
to Qx, where Q > 1. In the case where the option is ﬁnanced solely by equity the unlevered
ﬁrm value vu1 (x) is given by
vu1 (x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(1− τ)QXtdt|X0 = x
]
=
Qx
r − µ(1− τ) = Qv
u
0 (x). (4)
In the following sections I derive security and ﬁrm values before and after the exercise of the
growth option. These values, furthermore, determine the ﬁrst- and second-best investment
and ﬁnancing policies.
2.3 After Growth Option Exercise
Since the ﬁrm ﬁnance the growth option by issuing PSD, the coupon paid on the total debt
is given by c0 + (c1 − γxc1). The general solutions for the market values of equity and debt
after exercising the growth option are
E1(x) = (1− τ)
[(
Qx
r − µ −
c0 + c1
r
+
c1γx
r − µ
)]
+ ea1x
ξ1 + ea2x
ξ2 , (5)
Ds1(x) =
c0
r
+ da1sx
ξ1 + da2sx
ξ2 , (6)
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and
Dn1 (x) =
c1
r
− c1γx
r − µ + d
a
1nx
ξ1 + da2nx
ξ2 . (7)
Here xd1 denotes the default threshold, and ξ2 is negative root of the equation
1
2
σ2x(x −
1) + xµ− r = 0. The constants ea1, ea2, da1s, da2s, da1n and da2n are determined by the following
boundary conditions:
lim
x→∞
E1(x) = (1− τ)
[(
Qx
r − µ −
c0 + c1
r
+
c1γx
r − µ
)]
, (8)
E1(x
d
1) = 0, (9)
lim
x→∞
Ds1(x) =
c0
r
, (10)
Ds1(x
d
1) = D
s
1(x
d
1), (11)
lim
x→∞
Dn1 (x) =
c1
r
− c1γx
r − µ, (12)
Dn1 (x
d
1) = D
n
1 (x
d
1), (13)
Conditions (8), (10), and (12) are the usual 'no-bubble' conditions. Condition (9) states
that at the default boundary xd1 equity should have zero value, whereas conditions (11) and
(13) are some general value matching conditions at the default boundary xd1. When the ﬁrm
defaults, debt seniority structure gives the recovery values for the ﬁrst and the second debt,
denoted by Ds1(x
d
1) and D
n
1 (x
d
1), respectively. The superscripts s and n refers to the seasoned
and new debt issues, respectively. For x > xd1 the value of equity E1(x) is found to be
E1(x) = (1− τ)
[(
Qx
r − µ −
c0 + c1
r
+
c1γx
r − µ
)
−
(
Qxd1
r − µ −
c0 + c1
r
+
c1γx
d
1
r − µ
)(
x
xd1
)ξ2]
.
(14)
As usual xd1 is endogenously determined from the standard smooth-pasting condition
∂E1
∂x
|x=xd1 = 0. (15)
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Using (15) the optimal default boundary is given by
xd1 =
(c0 + c1)(r − µ)ξ2
r(Q+ c1γ)(ξ2 − 1) . (16)
For x > xd1 the market values of the two debt issues is given by
Ds1(x) =
c0
r
−
[c0
r
−Ds1(xd1)
]( x
xd1
)ξ2
, (17)
Dn1 (x) =
c1
r
− c1γx
r − µ
[
c1
r
− c1γx
r − µ −D
n
1 (x
d
1)
](
x
xd1
)ξ2
. (18)
The total debt value is D1(x) = D
s
1(x) + D
n
1 (x). Summing D1(x) and E1(x) gives the total
levered ﬁrm value v1(x):
v1(x) =
Qx(1− τ)
(r − µ) +
τ(c0 + c1)
r
− τc1γx
r − µ (19)
−
[
α
Qxd1(1− τ)
(r − µ) +
τ(c0 + c1)
r
− τc1γx
r − µ
](
x
xd1
)ξ2
.
Firm value v1(x) is given by the unlevered ﬁrm value
Qx(1−τ)
(r−µ) , plus the tax beneﬁts of debt
τ(c0+c1)
r
− τc1γx
r−µ , and minus the expected loss given default
[
α
Qxd1(1−τ)
(r−µ) +
τ(c0+c1)
r
− τc1γx
r−µ
] (
x
xd1
)ξ2
.
For the later analysis I ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne the function vn1 (x) as the sum of eq-
uity value E1(x) and the second debt issue D
n
1 (x). Using (14) and (18) v
n
1 (x) is equal to
vn1 (x) =
Qx(1− τ)
r − µ +
τ (c0 + c1)− c0
r
− τc1γx
r − µ (20)
+
(
Dn1 (x
d
1)−
Qx(1− τ)
r − µ −
τ (c0 + c1)− c0
r
+
τc1γx
r − µ
)(
x
xd1
)ξ2
.
The diﬀerence between v1(x) and v
n
1 (x) is crucial for my subsequent analysis. Equityholders
no longer care about the payoﬀs to the seasoned debt, and so they choose the investment
trigger point xi and the optimal amount of debt C
∗(Xt) = c∗1 − γc∗1x to maximize vn1 (x)
rather than v1(x).
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2.4 Before Growth Option Exercise
The general solutions for the market values of equity and debt prior to exercising the growth
option are
E0(x) = (1− τ)
(
x
r − µ −
c0
r
)
+ e1x
ξ1 + e2x
ξ2 , (21)
and
D0(x) =
c0
r
+ d1x
ξ1 + d2x
ξ2 , (22)
where ξ1 is the positive root of the equation
1
2
σ2x(x−1)+xµ−r = 0. The constants e1, e2, d1
and d2 are determined by the following boundary conditions:
E0(x
0
d) = 0, (23)
E0(xi) = E1(xi)− (I −Dn1 (xi)) , (24)
D0(x
0
d) = (1− α)
x(1− τ)
r − µ , (25)
D0(xi) = D
s
1(xi). (26)
Condition (23) states that at the default boundary x0d equity should have zero value, whereas
condition (24) is the value matching condition at the investment trigger xi. Similarly, con-
ditions (25) and (26) are the value matching conditions for debt at the default boundary
and the investment trigger point, respectively. The default boundary xd0 is again optimally
determined using the smooth pasting condition
∂E0(x)
∂x
|x=xd0 = 0. (27)
It turns out that the equity value before exercising the growth option E0(x) is given by
E0(x) = (1− τ)
[
x
r − µ −
c0
r
]
+ A(xi)Σ(x) +B(x
d
0)∆(x), (28)
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where
A = vn1 (xi)− I − (1− τ)
(
xi
r − µ −
c0
r
)
,
B = (1− τ)
(
c0
r
− x
d
0
r − µ
)
,
Ψ(x) =
(
xd0
)ξ1 xξ2 − (xd0)ξ2 xξ1(
xd0
)ξ2 (xi)ξ2 − (xd0)ξ2 (xi)ξ1 ,
∆(x) =
xξ1 (xi)
ξ2 − xξ2 (xi)ξ1(
xd0
)ξ2 (xi)ξ2 − (xd0)ξ2 (xi)ξ1
Similarly, the value of debt before exercising the growth option D0(x) is given by
D0(x) =
c0
r
−
(
c0
r
− (1− α)(1− τ) x
r − µ
)
∆(x)−
[(c0
r
−Ds1(xd1)
)( x
xd1
)ξ2]
Ψ(x) (29)
Summing E0(x) and D0(x) now gives us the total levered ﬁrm value before the growth option
is exercised v0(x):
v0(x) = (1− τ) x
r − µ +
τc0
r
+G(xi)Σ(x) +H(x
d
0)∆(x), (30)
where
G(xi) = v1(xi)− I −
(
(1− τ) xi
r − µ +
τc0
r
)
,
H(xd0) = −
(
τc0
r
+ α(1− τ) x
d
0
r − µ
)
.
The ﬁrm value v0(x) is given by the sum of the unlevered ﬁrm (1− τ) xr−µ plus the net gain
of exercising the growth option G(xi) multiplied by Ψ(x), the present value of receiving a
unit payoﬀ when the ﬁrm's cash ﬂow reaches the investment trigger point xi, minus the loss
given default H(xd0) multiplied by ∆(x), the present value of receiving a unit payoﬀ when
the ﬁrm goes bankrupt.
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2.5 Option Exercise and Financing Policies
The ﬁrst-best exercise and ﬁnancing policy is to choose both the investment trigger point
xi and the optimal coupon c
∗
1 so that the total ﬁrm value is maximized, i.e., xi and c
∗
1 is
determined from the following optimality conditions:
∂v0(x)
∂x
|x=xi =
∂v1(x)
∂x
|x=xi , (31)
∂v1(x)
∂c1
= 0. (32)
I, furthermore, make the standard assumption that the ﬁrst-best investment trigger point
is incontractible, and so both debt and equity will be priced under the assumption that
equityholders choose an equity-maximizing investment and ﬁnancing strategy, i.e., xi and c
∗
1
is chosen to maximize the sum of equity and the second debt issuance, rather than the sum
of equity and total debt. I refer to this strategy as the second-best exercise and ﬁnancing
policy. xi and c
∗
1 is now determined from the following optimality conditions:
∂E0(x)
∂x
|x=xi =
∂vn1 (x)
∂x
|x=xi , (33)
∂vn1 (x)
∂c1
= 0. (34)
As pointed out earlier the essential diﬀerence between the ﬁrst-best policy and the second-
best policy is that vn1 (x) enters the right side of the optimality conditions (33) and (34) in
the second best case, whereas the total ﬁrm value v1(x) enters the optimality conditions (31)
and (32) in the ﬁrst best case.
2.6 Debt Priority Structure
If the ﬁrm chooses to ﬁnance the growth option by issuing debt, and if the ﬁrm already has
existing debt, debt priority structure plays an important role. In the subsequent analysis I
will consider the three most important situations:
 Existing debt is senior and new debt is junior (APR).
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 Existing debt is junior and new debt is senior (APR).
 Existing debt and new debt has the same seniority (Pari Passu).
More formally I assume that if the equityholders declare bankruptcy the recovery value of
the ﬁrm is simply a fraction of the un-levered ﬁrm value given in (4), i.e, (1− α)vu1 (x). The
seniority structure further determines how this recovery value is split among creditors. If
absolute priority is enforced and existing debt is senior to new debt, the recovery value of
existing debt Ds1(x
d
1) is given by min
(
c0
r
, (1− α)vu1 (x)
)
, whereas the recover value of new
debt Dn1 (x
d
1) is given by (1− α)vu1 (x)−min
(
c0
r
, (1− α)vu1 (x)
)
.
If existing debt is junior and new debt is senior the recovery value of new debt Dn1 (x
d
1)
is given by min
(
c1
r
− c1γx
r−µ , (1− α)vu1 (x)
)
, whereas the recovery value of existing debt Ds1(x
d
1)
is given by (1− α)vu1 (x)−min
(
c1
r
− c1γx
r−µ , (1− α)vu1 (x)
)
.
In the case of equal seniority between existing and new debt the recovery value of exist-
ing debt Ds1(x
d
1) is given by (1 − α)vu1 (x) ∗ κs, where κs = c0c0+c1−c1γxd1 is the fraction of the
total recovery value that existing creditors receive. Similarly, the recovery value of new debt
Dn1 (x
d
1) is equal to (1− α)vu1 (x) ∗ κn, where κn = 1− κs, is the fraction of the total recovery
value that new creditors receive.
3 Solving the Model
3.1 No Debt Overhang
If the ﬁrm has no pre-existing debt, clearly xd0 = 0. The optimal default boundary x
d
1 is
given by
xd1 =
c1(r − µ)ξ2
r(Q+ c1γ)(ξ2 − 1) , (35)
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which clearly is decreasing in γ. With no pre-existing debt there is no diﬀerence between the
ﬁrst-best and second-best ﬁnancing and investment policies. The optimal investment trigger
point xi is equal to
xi =
c1(r − µ)ξ2
r(Q+ c1γ)(ξ2 − 1)
(
1−Q− τ +Qτ + c1γτ
Qξ2τ(ατ − τ − α) +Qτ + c1γτ
) 1
ξ2−1
. (36)
There is no closed form solution for the optimal coupon c∗1, so this needs to be solved for by
numerical methods. Doing so I normalize the starting value of the cash ﬂow process to x = 1
and assume the following base case parameter values: I = 10, Q = 2, r = 6%, σ = 25%, τ =
15%, µ = 1%, α = 25%. Figure 1 plots the optimal leverage D1/(D1 + E1) for diﬀerent
values of the performance sensitivity parameter γ. The plot clearly shows that the optimal
leverage is decreasing in γ, meaning that the risk of having to pay increased coupons in times
when cash ﬂow is low reduce the ﬁrm's appetite of risky debt. This observation implies that
ﬁrms which are initially capitalized with PSD, will reduce future conﬂicts related to debt
overhang, since problems of debt overhang is increasing in initial leverage4. To make sure
that this is a valid conclusion I examine how optimal leverage relates to changes in input
parameters. Figure 2 clearly shows that optimal leverage is decreasing regardless of input
parameter values, implying that my conclusion is robust.
3.2 Debt Overhang
With debt overhang equityholders have an incentive to deviate from ﬁrst-best ﬁnancing and
investment policies, and to dilute existing creditors. This behavior represents a cost which
may reduce the total value of the ﬁrm. Costs from such suboptimal decisions are typically
referred to as agency costs of debt. Denote the total time zero market value of the levered
ﬁrm when equityholders choose ﬁrm value maximizing ﬁnancing and investment policies by
vFB0 (x). Correspondingly the time zero market value of the levered ﬁrm when equityholders
pursue equity maximizing ﬁnancing and investment policies is denoted vSB0 (x). The total
4See, e.g., Sundaresan & Wang (2007) for a proof.
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Figure 1: This ﬁgure show the optimal leverage for a ﬁrm with no debt overhang, i.e., c0 = 0. Base
case parameter values: I = 10, Q = 2, r = 6%, σ = 25%, τ = 15%, µ = 1%, α = 25%.
agency costs of debt (AC) are then deﬁned as:
AC =
vFB0 (x)− vSB0 (x)
vFB0 (x)
.
Since my focus is on how PSD aﬀects investment and ﬁnancing incentives I am interested
in how the performance sensitivity parameter λ aﬀects the total agency costs. If it is the
case that using PSD ﬁnancing reduces problems related to debt overhang and closes the gap
between ﬁrst-best and second-best policies, the agency costs will decrease for λ > 0, and
PSD ﬁnancing is a more eﬃcient ﬁnancing tool than ﬁxed coupon debt. If it is the case
that PSD ﬁnancing worsens the problems related to debt overhang and increase the gap
between ﬁrst-best and second-best policies, the agency costs will increase for λ > 0, and
PSD ﬁnancing is ineﬃcient compared to ﬁxed coupon debt.
It is well known that debt overhang might lead to two diﬀerent investment ineﬃciencies;
underinvestment and asset substitution (risk-shifting). Whether debt overhang causes un-
derinvestment or asset substitution is strongly related to the chosen priority structure. Un-
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Figure 2: This ﬁgure show the optimal leverage for a ﬁrm with no debt overhang, i.e., c0 = 0, when
changing diﬀerent input parameter values. When changing one parameter all others are
kept at their base case values: I = 10, Q = 2, r = 6%, σ = 25%, τ = 15%, µ = 1%.
derinvestment occurs when existing creditors is suﬃciently protected, meaning that they are
almost sure to beneﬁt from the proceeds resulting from the growth option exercise. Since
equityholders pay the cost of exercising the option, and since they have to split the pro-
ceeds with existing creditors, debt overhang causes equityholders to postpone investment,
i.e., the result is underinvesting. Equityholders' incentives to engage in asset substitution
17
increase when initial creditors do not have suﬃcient protection or when it becomes to costly
to postpone growth option exercise. Conveniently, the model framework I use, generates
underinvestment when initial debt is senior to the new debt issue, whereas asset substitution
is generated when both existing and new debt have equal priority, or when new debt is senior
to existing debt. I illustrate this point by numerically solving the model with the following
input parameters: I = 10, Q = 2, r = 6%, σ = 25%, τ = 15%, µ = 1%, λ = 0, c0 = 0.5. The
results are reported in Table 1. Here I report the ﬁrst best investment trigger xFBi , the ﬁrst
best ﬁnancing policy cFB1 , the second best investment trigger x
SB
i , the second best ﬁnancing
policy cSB1 , the ﬁrst best ﬁrm value v
FB
0 , the second best ﬁrm value v
SB
0 and the agency
cost of debt (AC) for the diﬀerent debt priority structures. When both types of debt have
equal priority we see that equityholders risk-shift by investing at a threshold value of 1.18,
which is lower than the ﬁrst best investment threshold of 1.27. They also deviate from ﬁrst
best ﬁnancing by taking on more additional debt, as seen by the coupon of 1.53 which is
larger than the ﬁrst best coupon of 0.91. The deviations from ﬁrst best leads to a total value
reduction of 0.27%, which is quite small. If new debt is senior to existing debt we clearly see
that the incentives to engage in risk shifting increase substantially. The investment threshold
is now 1.03, with an optimal coupon of 1.85. The value reduction is now equal to 3.95%,
which is large. When initial debt has seniority above new debt we see that equityholders
underinvest, as the investment threshold increases to 1.33, which is larger than the ﬁrst
best threshold of 1.27. Equityholders again deviate from ﬁrst best ﬁnancing by taking on
less additional debt, as seen from the coupon of 0.57, which is smaller than the ﬁrst best
coupon of 0.91. The value reduction from the policy deviations is equal to 0.76% in this case.
In Table 1 I assumed that the growth option was ﬁnanced by issuing ﬁxed coupon debt.
Assume now that the growth option could be ﬁnanced by issuing PSD. To get a feeling of
how using PSD ﬁnancing changes equityholders' investment and ﬁnancing incentives, Table
2 report the agency costs of debt for diﬀerent values of the sensitivity parameter λ. From
the numbers it is clear that in the cases where debt overhang causes equityholders to engage
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Priority Structure xFBi c
FB
1 x
SB
i c
SB
1 v
FB
0 v
SB
0 AC (%)
Equal Priority 1.27 0.91 1.18 1.53 26.29 26.22 0.27
Initial Debt Senior 1.27 0.91 1.33 0.57 26.29 26.09 0.76
New Debt Senior 1.27 0.91 1.03 1.85 26.29 25.26 3.95
Table 1: Table reports the ﬁrst best investment trigger xFBi , the ﬁrst best ﬁnancing policy c
FB
1 ,
the second best investment trigger xSBi , the second best ﬁnancing policy c
SB
1 , the ﬁrst
best ﬁrm value vFB0 , the second best ﬁrm value v
SB
0 and the agency cost of debt (AC)
for diﬀerent debt priority structures; equal priority, initial debt has seniority above new
debt and new debt has seniority above initial debt. Input parameters are ﬁxed at base
case values: I = 10, Q = 2, r = 6%, σ = 25%, τ = 15%, µ = 1%, λ = 0, c0 = 0.5
in asset substitution, using PSD ﬁnancing only enhances the problem. With λ = 0.3 the
agency costs of debt increase approximately 1.5 and 2.2 percentage points in the cases of
equal priority and new debt being senior, respectively. In the case where debt overhang
causes underinvestment PSD ﬁnancing reduces the agency costs of debt by 0.6 percentage
points. The reason for these results is that issuing debt that makes the ﬁrm pay higher
coupons when cash ﬂow is low lead the equity option faster and further out of the money,
and, hence, equityholders have larger incentives to invest earlier rather than later. Table 2
also illustrates the main point in this paper, namely that PSD ﬁnancing worsens the problem
of asset substitution, but may partially resolve problems of underinvestment.
Priority Structure λ = 0 λ = 0.05 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.15 λ = 0.2 λ = 0.25 λ = 0.3
Equal Priority 0.27 0.39 0.54 0.73 0.98 1.33 1.79
Initial Debt Senior 0.74 0.68 0.61 0.53 0.43 0.33 0.14
New Debt Senior 3.95 4.12 4.36 4.66 5.05 5.54 6.18
Table 2: Table reports the agency costs of debt related to deviations from ﬁrst best investment
and ﬁnancing policies for diﬀerent values of the performance sensitivity parameter λ. The
increasing agency costs in row 2 and 4 indicates that PSD ﬁnancing worsens the problem
of asset substitution, whereas the decreasing agency costs in row 3 indicates that PSD
ﬁnancing partially resolves problems related to underinvestment.
3.3 Variation of Input Parameters
As I showed in subsection 3.2, equal priority or letting the new debt have seniority above
existing debt both generated problems of asset substitution. When I examine how my results
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are aﬀected by changes in input parameters I focus only on the case where all creditors have
equal priority5, or where existing debt is senior to new debt.
Figure 3 plots the agency costs of debt (AC) as a function of the performance sensitiv-
ity parameter λ under the assumption that existing debt and new debt have equal priority.
It clearly shows that the agency costs of debt is monotonously increasing for all diﬀerent
parameters used, except for the drift parameter µ, where the agency costs starts to decline
when λ becomes suﬃciently large. The agency costs are, however, still smallest for λ = 0.
These results ensure that the conclusions made in section 3.2, that PSD ﬁnancing worsens
problems related to debt overhang, is valid for any input parameter values, and hence re-
mains very robust.
Figure 4 also plots the agency costs of debt (AC) as a function of the performance sensitivity
parameter λ, but now under the assumption that initial debt has priority above new debt,
i.e., the focus is on underinvestment. It shows that the agency costs of debt is monotonously
decreasing in µ, τ and α. When the initial debt is high c0 = 1, we see that the cost of
postponing investment is too big, and equityholders have incentives to risk-shift, leading
agency costs of debt to increase with λ. Also for large values of σ we see that having a too
aggressive performance sensitivity parameter might lead equityholders to risk-shift. For low
invest cost I equityholders also have incentives to invest early, rendering PSD ineﬃcient in
this case. The eﬀect of changing the growth option component Q is also not unambiguous,
but the valuation eﬀects are so close to zero that these are negligible. Over all the analysis
supports the conclusion that PSD ﬁnancing reduce problems related to underinvestment.
5In the case of new debt being senior, the graphs show exactly the same patterns as for equal priority.
They are available upon request.
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4 Conclusion
I examine interactions between investment and ﬁnancing decisions using a dynamic model
where a ﬁrm has assets in place, and an option to expand operations. My model allows
for the possibility that the ﬁrm's initial capital structure might consist of both debt and
equity, and also the possibility that the growth option is ﬁnanced by issuing performance
sensitive debt (PSD). I speciﬁcally address the question whether PSD ﬁnancing could solve
ineﬃciencies related to asset substitution and underinvestment.
With no pre-existing debt I show that any ﬁrm would have lower optimal leverage when
using PSD, compared to using regular ﬁxed coupon debt. This observation suggests that
ﬁrms which are initially capitalized by PSD would have less future problems related to debt
overhang, since such problems is increasing in initial leverage.
With pre-existing debt my model clearly illustrates that PSD ﬁnancing increases equity-
holders' incentives to engage in asset substitution, and that PSD is ineﬃcient compared
to ﬁxed coupon debt in these cases. This conclusion questions the hypothesis that PSD is
used to prevent asset substitution. Instead, the analysis suggests that PSD partially reduce
agency costs related to underinvestment.
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Figure 3: This ﬁgure plots the agency costs of debt as a function of the performance sensitivity
parameter λ, for diﬀerent input parameter values. It assumes that the creditors have
equal priority in bankruptcy. When changing one parameter all others are kept at their
base case values: I = 10, Q = 2, r = 6%, σ = 25%, τ = 15%, µ = 1%, c0 = 0.5.
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Figure 4: This ﬁgure plots the agency costs of debt as a function of the performance sensitivity
parameter λ, for diﬀerent input parameter values. It assumes that existing debt has
seniority in bankruptcy. When changing one parameter all others are kept at their base
case values: I = 10, Q = 2, r = 6%, σ = 25%, τ = 15%, µ = 1%, c0 = 0.5.
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